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Abstract The classic model of conversation based on the Common Ground 
(CG), introduced by Karttunen (1974), Lewis (1979) and Stalnaker (1978), was 
shown to be insufficient for accounting for various conversational phenomena 
(inter alia Portner 2004, 2007; Farkas & Bruce 2009; Murray 2014). This paper 
further strengthens this line by analyzing a type of non-truth conditional non-core 
dative termed the Discursive Dative (DD) as a discourse management device 
(Krifka 2008; Repp 2013). The DD signals that the asserted proposition p 
constitutes an exception to a normative generalization believed by the speaker to 
be shared by the speech event participants. In order to capture the notion of 
exception we propose to divide the CG into two sets of worlds, those consistent 
with previous assertions and their presuppositions (CGA) and those consistent 
with generalizations (CGG). The DD signals a non-inclusion relation between the 
asserted proposition and the CGG. This enables us to distinguish between 
different types of mirativity effects, by drawing a distinction between adding a 
proposition p that was not previously in the speaker’s expectation-set (inter alia 
DeLancey 1997, 2001; Rett 2009; Peterson 2013; Rett & Murray 2013) and the 
present case of the DD, where p can very well be in the speaker’s expectation-set, 
but objectively expected that ~p. 
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1  Introduction 
The paper aims at providing further support for the claim that having a model 
with only the classic Common Ground (CG) introduced by Karttunen (1974), 
Lewis (1979) and Stalnaker (1978) is insufficient for accounting for various 
conversational phenomena (other reasons for making such a claim were provided 
by inter alia Portner 2004, 2007; Farkas & Bruce 2009; Murray 2014). The 
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empirical motivation for the current proposal comes from an examination of a 
phenomenon in Hebrew of a construction containing a non-truth conditional non-
core dative, termed by Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh (2015a) the Discursive Dative 
(DD): 
(1)  hu  lo   lakax  liDD  'et   ha-trufa! 
  he  not  took  to.me  ACC  the-medicine 
  ‘He didn't take his medicine. That's weird!’ 
The dative component is a PP consisting of the preposition l- ‘to’, and its object.1  
We claim that its use in (1) relies on the knowledge that the relevant person is 
following a medical treatment, and the deontic generalization that in the relevant 
case people follow the norm and take the medicine prescribed to them. Thus, the 
fact expressed in (1) is an exception to this deontic generalization, while the 
generalization itself still holds true. We will suggest, accordingly, that the DD is a 
discourse management device. As such, its role is to indicate the status of p 
against the background of the conversation (cf. Krifka 2008; Repp 2013; Murray 
2014). In other words, in what follows, we will analyze the DD as a linguistic 
expression which points to the fact that the asserted proposition constitutes an 
EXCEPTION to a generalization assumed by the speaker to be available to the 
speech event participants. 
Providing a discourse update analysis for the DD construction explains a 
hitherto unresolved issue pertaining to this type of non-core dative construction. 
Previous studies of non-core datives in Hebrew (Berman 1982; Borer & 
Grodzinsky 1986; Ariel et al. 2015) characterize what we call the DD as part of 
the broader phenomenon of Ethical Dative (ED), whose function is to express the 
speaker’s stance towards the underlying proposition, usually the speaker's surprise 
or irritation concerning the content of the proposition (cf. Juitteau & Rezac 2007 
for French; Gutzmann 2007 for German; Rákosi 2008 for Hungarian; 
Michelioudakis & Kapogianni 2013 for Modern Greek, among many others for 
related constructions in various languages). In contrast to this view, we will argue 
that the DD is not primarily dedicated to the expression of surprise or other such 
emotional stances. Consequently, we will propose a new type of mirativity effect.  
Our account for grasping the semantics of the DD traces the source of this 
undocumented mirativity effect to a particular discourse update where the state of 
affairs denoted by the prejacent is not compatible with a set of backgrounded 
objective norms, and therefore is expected not to occur. This contrasts with 
previous accounts of similar such effects (see inter alia DeLancey 1997, 2001; 
                                                          
1 By dative, we follow a common practice in the literature to refer to whichever form a given 
language uses to express dative case, or the equivalent of the dative case in languages with no 
morphological case. In Hebrew the form is l-DPs ‘to-DP’.  In all the examples the relevant dative 
pronoun is marked with the subscript DD. 
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Rett 2009; Peterson 2013; Rett & Murray 2013), which rely on the analysis that 
the state of affairs denoted by the prejacent is not part of a contextually available 
set of the speaker's personal expectations, and therefore not expected to occur.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the DD and 
discuss the interpretative properties of constructions containing it; in Section 3, 
we carefully tease apart the conversational effects induced by the DD from its 
main interpretative contribution described in Section 2. Section 4 details our 
analysis of the DD modelling the notion of EXCEPTION. In Section 5 we provide 
substantiation for the proposed analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
2  The Discursive Dative 
Colloquial Hebrew has a construction featuring a non-selected non-core dative in 
the first and second person. We will begin with a description of this construction 
putting an emphasis on its interpretative properties. Consider the following 
documented example in the context provided: 
(2)  [(B) is singing, his wife (A) says]:2  
  A:  ze   ha-tav     še-'ani  haxi   sonet! 
   this  the-musical note  that-I  the.most  hate.FSG 
   ‘This is the musical note I hate most!’ 
  B:  ma  'at    sonet  liDD  tavim?! 
   what you.FSG  hate.FSG to.me  musical notes 
   ‘How come you hate musical notes?!’ 
B's utterance expresses the following meaning components: (i) The speaker (B) 
didn't know until now that his wife (A) hated particular musical notes; (ii) the 
generalization that people do not hate musical notes. The DD li 'to me' has no 
truth conditional contribution to the meaning of the proposition, and therefore it 
could be omitted from the English translation. Further evidence for the irrelevance 
of the DD to truth conditions will be provided in Section 5. Crucially then, the 
sentence with a DD makes salient a conversational background, detailed in (ii) for 
the current example. 
 What attests to there being a salient generalization in the conversational 
background is an exchange like the following, that could naturally continue the 
one in (2): 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 This is an attested example, N. Faust (p.c) 
Discourse update at the service of mirativity effects: The case of the Discursive Dative 
106 
(3)  A: lama 'ata  omer 'et   ze? 
   why you say  ACC this 
   ‘Why do you say so?’ 
  B: 'anašim  lo   son'im   tavim 
   people  not  hate.PL  musical notes 
   ‘People don’t hate musical notes.’ 
Here, when the wife, A, asks for B to clarify the purpose of his utterance, he does 
so by making explicit the generalization he takes to hold in the conversational 
background.    
Additional attested examples further illustrate the point that the clause 
containing a DD makes available a salient generalization. As the following 
documented examples show, either the generalization is made explicit in the 
speaker's utterance (4) or they can be accommodated contextually (5). Example 
(4) is a reaction by the speaker to the information that his acquaintance is 
preparing to fly to Switzerland to watch a soccer game.  
(4)  'eyze   tas  la-misxak?  be-'aškelon  hu  lo  holex,  
  which fly   to.the-game, in-Ashkelon  he not go,   
  ex       tas      liDD   le-švaic?! 
  how  flying to.me to-Switzerland 
‘What do you mean fly to the (soccer) game, this is unusual since even to 
Ashkelon he won’t go, now he’s flying to Switzerland?!’ 
The statement in (4) 'ex tas li le-švaic ‘how come he’s flying to Switzerland’, 
relies on the knowledge that the relevant person never goes to soccer games as he 
never even goes to watch local games (Ashkelon is a town in Israel). It relies on 
the epistemic generalization that whoever is not interested in going to local soccer 
games would not travel abroad to watch them. Consider next (5): 
(5)  'axšav, 'al kol  falcan   hem yešalmu  liDD milyon yuro 
  now, on every stuck up  they will.pay  to.me  million euro 
‘Now, they’ll be willing to pay a million euros for every stuck up (soccer 
player).’ 
The speaker in (5) presents his conjectures as to the sums of money involved in 
the acquisition of soccer players. The statement in (5) relies on the moral 
generalization, to which the speaker adheres, that one should not pay such big 
sums for just any soccer player. 
 For both cases, it is significant that the fact signaled by the prejacent, namely, 
the dative-less proposition (his flying to the game in Switzerland (4), and their 
eventual paying of a million euros for just any soccer player (5)) does not alter the 
generalization explicitly stated in (4) as: be-'aškelon hu lo holex ‘even to 
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Ashkelon he won’t go’, and accommodated in the case of (5). Crucially, as will be 
elaborated in Section 4, these generalizations are not factual universal claims 
which presumably cannot allow exceptions. They are norms and therefore it is 
possible to encounter events that do not follow the generalizations that constitute 
the relevant norms. Here lies the source for our claim that the datival expression 
marks the assertion as an exception to a salient contextual generalization. 
3  The mirativity effect induced by the DD 
The examples containing DDs described in the previous section all pertain to a 
colloquial register and are highly expressive. Similar sentences to those we group 
in Hebrew under the category of DD were previously analyzed as tokens of what 
is often designated in the literature as Ethical Datives (ED).3 The ED is 
characterized as holding the following two properties: first, it is restricted to first 
and/or second person; second, it expresses the speaker’s emotional stance towards 
the underlying proposition, often irritation or surprise.4 In other words, the ED 
gives rise to a mirativity effect (cf. Rooryck 2001). The goal of this section is to 
demonstrate, at least for the DD in Hebrew, that while this type of datival 
construction is indeed restricted to first and second person, singular and plural, the 
DD should not be categorially classified as a mirativity marker, whose main 
semantic contribution is to convey an emotional stance of the speaker (cf. 
DeLancey 1997; Peterson 2013). Accordingly, these effects are merely by 
products of the main function of the DD. 
First and foremost, it is crucial to point out that the effect of surprise is in fact 
epiphenomenal. Examples (6)-(8) clearly show that the DD by itself does not 
encode surprise or expectations, since while uttering the assertions in (1), (4)-(5) 
above the speaker may very well comment on the expectedness of the asserted 
propositions.  
(6)  'at  'od  tisne'i   liDD   tavim 
  you  more  will hate to.me  musical notes 
  ‘(At the end) you may even get to hate musical notes.’ 
 
                                                          
3 This paper is part of a broader project, outlined in Bar-Asher Siegal and Boneh (2015a), of 
classifying non-core datives in Hebrew and in other languages. In this typology the main criterion 
for the classification of these datives has to do with the contribution of the dative to the truth-
conditions. Accordingly, there are no justifications for having the ED as an independent category. 
Sentences which were previously analyzed as examples of ED, in the current classification, fall 
under two different categories, depending on whether the datival expression contributes to the 
truth-conditions of the sentence in which it appears. 
4 For a more extensive discussion of the Ethical Dative see Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh (2015a) and 
references therein. 
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(7)  ze lo   mafti'a  'oti  še-lamrot   še-be-'aškelon  hu lo  holex,  
  it  not  surprise  me  that-although  that-in-Ashkelon he  not go,  
  hu  tas   liDD  le-švaic 
  he  flying  to.me  to-Switzerland 
‘It doesn’t surprise me that although he won’t go to Ashkelon, he’s flying 
to Switzerland.’ 
(8)  ze  barur/cafuy   še-'axšav  'al kol falcan  
  it  clear/expected  that-now on every stuck up   
  hem yešalmu liDD  milyon  yuro 
  they  will.pay to.me million  euro 
‘It is clear/expected that now for every stuck up soccer player they’ll be 
willing to pay a million euros.’ 
In (6) the speaker predicts that "you will come to hate musical notes" namely that 
this state of affairs is expected by the speaker to stand in contrast to the available 
generalization in the background "people do not hate musical notes". Similarly, in 
(7)-(8), one can see that the asserted proposition including the DD can be 
embedded under the predicates such as 'be surprised', 'be clear', 'be expected'. In 
other words, we discard the possibility that the DD in Hebrew is a mirativity 
morpheme dedicated to the expression of surprise or that it implies that 
subjectively the statement was unexpected by the speaker. Instead, we develop in 
the next section the notion of EXCEPTION, where a proposition may have an 
objective status of 'expected to not be true' due to certain accepted norms with 
which that proposition is inconsistent. To be more specific, for Rett (2011) and 
Rett & Murray (2013), the addition of a mirative expression to a proposition p 
conveys that p was not previously in the speaker's expectation-set. In our case, p 
can still be in the speaker's expectation-set. It is only crucial that, from a 
normative point of view, it was expected that ~p. 
We turn now to the emotional stance produced in these constructions. Again, 
it can be shown that this is not a core meaning component of the DD since it can 
be overridden. This is illustrated in the following examples, where it is perfectly 
possible to add expressions such as “… but I don’t care/give a damn” to all the 
above examples.5 For instance: 
                                                          
5 Crucially, such expressions cannot be felicitously added to constructions who truly express an 
emotional or psychological effect, namely Affected Dative (AD) constructions (see Bar-Asher 
Siegal & Boneh 2015a, cf. Bosse et al. 2012). In (i) the dative has an entirely different purpose, 
which is adding an affected participant:  
(i) a. 'axarkax hu  tas   liAD  le-šana  la-mizrax,  ve-hiš'ir 'oti  xareda  ve-lexuca 
Then  he flew  to.me  to-year  to.the-east,  and-left  me  anxious  and-stressed 
‘The he flew on me to the Far East for a year, and left me anxious and stressed.’ 
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(9)  ze lo  maziz   li   še-'at   sonet  liDD  tavim,  
  it   not move.SG  to.me  that you.F hate  to.me musical notes   
‘I don't care that you hate some musical notes.’ 
(10) a. 'eyze tas   la-misxak?     be-'aškelon  hu lo holex,  
   which fly  to.the-game? in-Ashkelon  he not go,   
   ex       tas      liDD   le-švaic?! 
   how  flying to.me to-Switzerland 
‘What do you mean fly to the (soccer) game, this is unusual since even 
to Ashkelon he won’t go, he’s flying to Switzerland?! 
   b. …'aval  'ani  ma  'expat  li 
   …but  I  what  care  to.me 
   ‘…but what do I care?’ 
 To sum up, the fact that the connotations of irritation, surprise or other such 
attitudes, often related to this type of non-core dative, are cancellable reveals that 
they are by-products of its essential property, which is to draw attention to a 
particular relationship of incompatibility between the expressed dative-less 
proposition and a background generalization (cf. Ariel et al. 2015).   
4  Analysis: Modeling the notion of EXCEPTION  
To model the notion of EXCEPTION essential for the understanding the function of 
the DD, we begin by following the basic lines of the model of conversation 
endorsed by Karttunen (1974), Lewis (1979) and Stalnaker (1978). According to 
this model, assertions stand against a set of world-states that constitute the 
background knowledge shared by the conversational participants and rule out 
certain possible world-states as not obtaining. A successful assertion ends with a 
new proposition admitted into the shared background knowledge. Assertions, 
                                                                                                                                                               
b. # 'aval ma   'expat  li 
   but  what  care  to.me 
   ‘but what do I  care.’ 
In this attested example, where the datival expression is added to the same type of predicate as in 
(4) above, the referent of the dative is emotionally affected by his flying to the Far East, as the 
second part of the example makes clear ("and left me anxious and stressed"). In such cases, adding 
lo ixpat li ‘I don’t care’ results in an incoherent discourse, since the speaker is clearly 
psychologically affected, and this affect cannot be cancelled. Note that in this example there is no 
salient normative generalization, epistemic or deontic, in the conversational background. In other 
words, we point to a correlation between the possibility to cancel the emotional or psychological 
effect or the speaker's stance and the availability of a relevant normative generalization in the 
conversational background. We have shown that in the case of the DD, where such generalizations 
are available, the emotional stance is always cancellable. 
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accordingly, narrow the set of world-states (‘the context set’) that remain 
compatible with what has been presupposed or established. This set of world-
states is the way to formally represent the Common Ground (CG), the shared 
information mutually recognized by the speech event participants. 
Numerous studies have shown that this model is insufficient for tackling 
various conversational phenomena (see inter alia Portner 2004, 2007; Farkas & 
Bruce 2009; Murray 2014). Farkas and Bruce (2009), for example, argue that in 
order to grasp the function of polar questions one must emphasize the proposal 
nature of assertion. Accordingly, they characterize ordinary assertions as 
proposing additions to the CG, rather than actually changing it.  
We would like to add another component to this model of the CG, an addition 
that stems from the recognition that an assertion can come with a discourse 
management device. The notion of a discourse management device was 
introduced by Krifka (2008) for linguistic expressions that indicate the CG status 
of a proposition. Repp (2013), following Romero & Han (2004), proposes various 
discourse management devices, indicating whether or not a proposition p is part 
of the CG or indicating the interlocutors' current stance towards p. In what 
follows we will propose to consider a new type of discourse management device 
for capturing the notion of EXCEPTION. In order to model it we have to make some 
amendments to the classic model of the conversation concerning the structure of 
the context set. 
The notion of EXCEPTION challenges the classic model of CG dealing only 
assertions and presupposition, which are sets of possible worlds that are either 
part of the CG or not. The reason for this challenge stems from the fact that it 
requires a mechanism that allows certain propositions to have a double status: on 
the one hand, to be asserted as true, and on the other hand, to be set of worlds that 
are not a sub-set of the set of worlds that constitute those of the background 
accepted assumptions. Thus, while a proposition p is asserted, there is a 
generalization accepted by the speech event participants that entails that ~p, 
which all of the participants in the conversation do not reject despite the 
acceptance of p as true. Thus, conversations also rely on the acceptance of various 
modal (epistemic, stereotypical, and deontic) generalizations (cf. Portner 2007). 
These generalizations allow prospects as to which possible worlds should obtain. 
Thus, we propose to divide the representation of the CG into two sets of worlds, 
those consistent with previous assertions and their presuppositions (CGA) and 
those consistent with generalizations (CGG). (11) characterizes the addition to the 
CG we would like to propose:  
(11) The CGG is a set, which contains possible worlds that are consistent with  
various generalizations, without exceptions.  
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The generalizations relevant for the phenomenon of the DD are normative 
from the perspective of the speaker, in the broader sense of the term, 
encompassing what is considered to be the normal or the appropriate way of 
doing something or what normally happens. Thus, the nature of such 
generalizations can be either deontic or stereotypical; for example, the 
generalization, against which the prejacent of (1) is made, is deontic. In other 
words, the CGA is a set of worlds consistent with statements, assumed or asserted 
in the conversation; while the CGG is a set of worlds consistent with the 
normative statements assumed in the conversation. Consequently, these 
generalizations should be modelled as all the speaker's epistemically accessible 
worlds w' that conform to the speaker's knowledge in w, and assumed by him to 
be part of the common knowledge of all given interlocutors, about what is the 
normative state-of-affairs.  
Such generalizations are related to generics (characterizing sentences) if those 
are analyzed as modals, expressing normativity, and as such containing universal 
quantifiers over possible worlds (inter alia Asher & Morreau 1995). These 
general statements must be different from generics if the latter are defined as a 
certain type of assertions about the actual world, in such a way as to allow for 
exceptions, since as such they are part of the CGA (cf. Krifka et al. 1995; Cohen 
2004; Greenberg 2007 inter alia).  
Consequently, we suggest the following semantic representation for the DD as 
a discourse management device, capturing the notion of exception:  
(12) [[DD]]sp = λp<s,t>λw∀w'∈Episp(w) (p⊄CGGw').p(w)  
In all the speaker's epistemically accessible worlds w' that conform to the 
speaker’s knowledge in w (and assumed by him to be part of the common 
knowledge), it holds that the proposition in question is not in the CGG. 
Discourse management devices only indicate the status of p in the CG. As 
such the [[DD]]sp takes a proposition with its truth value and never alters it (see 
also Section 5); the only new contribution of the DD is an additional indication 
about the status of the proposition with respect to the CGG, namely that this set of 
worlds does not intersect with CGG. Thus, the part in the formula before the 
period "." only indicates felicity and not a truth-conditional meaning.6 
 Once our model divides the context set into two sets of worlds, those 
consistent with previous assertions and their presuppositions (CGA) and those 
consistent with the relevant generalizations (CGG), we can think of various logical 
relations between the two sets of worlds, and it is our claim that this is precisely  
                                                          
6 The formula in (12) is suited only for indicative statements, in which p is evaluated according to 
the actual world. This is, however, not necessary. As examples (5) and (6) demonstrate, the DD 
can be added to modal statements as well. This further development is beyond the scope of the 
current paper. 
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what is relevant for the linguistic phenomenon of DD, and more specifically to the 
felicity of its use. According to (12), what felicitates the appearance of the DD is 
the fact that the CGG and the set of worlds in which p is true are disjoint. 
Therefore it is possible to add the DD to p when ~p is entailed by CGG, as 
summarized in (13). 
(13) The DD is a discourse management device indicating the non-overlap 
between the CGA and the CGG.   
We turn now to illustrate the relevance of the various logical relations 
between the CGG and the CGA. The CGA, as a set of worlds, can be a subset of the 
CGG, with respect to a relevant proposition. From a discursive point of view, no 
need arises to assert sentences that are true in the CGG, for example, when it is a 
valid conversational assumption to assume the knowledge that “The sun rises in 
the east”. It goes without saying that in such a case a DD would be infelicitous, 
and may only be appropriate in a science fiction scenario, where the course of 
plants may be altered, in which case the CG will be a different one. 
Now, when the CGA is a subset of the CGG, sentences that are held true in all 
possible worlds members of the CGA and in some of the worlds that are members 
of the set of the CGG (i.e. it is not inconsistent with any generalization) are 
infelicitous with a DD. This is illustrated in (14) and schematized in Figure 1. 
(14) hu  nasa  #liDD  la-'avoda   ba-'otobus 
  He drove to.me to.the-work in.the-bus  
  ‘He went to work by bus. #That’s weird!’ 
                 Initial stage CGG and the CGA after assertion of p 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relevant Knowledge:           
Some people take the bus to work 
some do not 
⊨ (he took the bus to work)  (he didn't 
take the bus to work) 
   Assertion of p: 
   He took the bus to work 
 
Figure 1       Discourse update where the added proposition is part of the CGG 
      GG 
 w1 
     w3            w7   
p  w5          w6 
w9       
 ~p 
 
 
       CGG 
   
 
 
 
CGA 
w6    
 p  w7 
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In Figure 2, we schematize the case where the CGG and the CGA are disjoint. 
The CGG is the set of all possible worlds which do not obtain p, since an accepted 
generalization entails that p does not hold. Thus, the CGA, which contains only 
the possible worlds in which p hold, and the CGG are disjoint. 
(15) 'eyze  tas  la-misxak?  be-'aškelon hu lo  holex,  
Which fly to.the-game? in-Ashkelon  he  not go,  
ex   tas   liDD  le-švaic?! 
how  flying  to.me  to-Switzerland 
‘What do you mean fly to the (soccer) game, this is unusual since even to 
Ashkelon he won’t go, how come he’s flying to Switzerland?!’  
CGA He is flying to Switzerland (for a soccer game) 
CGG Given his habits, he does not fly abroad (for soccer games)  
⊨ He isn't flying to Switzerland (for a soccer game) 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
In the remainder of this section, we return to the examples with the DD (1)-
(2), (5) and schematically illustrate the relation between the CGG and the CGA for 
each. In what follows, norms are stated as generic ("People do X in the case of 
Y") and not as modals ("People should do X in the case of Y"), as we wish to 
capture the set of worlds in which the generalizations are realized. 
Initial stage CGG and the CGA after assertion of p 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Relevant Knowledge: 
i. He never goes to soccer games  
ii. Whoever is not interested in 
seeing local games wouldn't 
travel abroad to see a soccer 
game. 
⊨ ~p [p: He will go to (a soccer 
game in) Switzerland] 
Assertion of p: 
He will go to (a soccer game in) Switzerland 
 
Figure 2       Discourse update where the added proposition is not part of the CGG 
             CGG 
              w1 
    w7    w5     w6 
w9                       
w4 
        ~p 
 
 
             CGG 
              w1 
    w7    w5     w6 
w9                       
w4 
        ~p 
 
 
             CGA 
              w3 
                      w8 
w4 
          p 
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(16) hu  lo   lakax   liDD  'et  ha-trufa! 
  he  not  took   to.me  ACC  the-medicine 
  ‘He didn't take his medicine. That's weird!’ 
CGA He did not take the medicine (prescribed to him) 
CGG People who are ill take the medicines prescribed to them  
⊨ He took the medicine prescribed to him 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
(17) ma  'at    sonet  liDD  tavim?! 
  what you.FSG  hate.FSG  to.me  musical notes 
  ‘How come you hate notes?!’ 
CGA You hate some musical notes 
CGG Musical notes are not something people usually hate  
⊨ You don't hate musical notes 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
(18) 'axšav 'al kol falcan   'od  yešalmu liDD milyon  yuro 
now on every stuck up more will pay  to.me million  euro 
  ‘Now for every stuck up (player) they will pay a million euro.’ 
CGA They will pay a million euros for every stuck up player 
CGG No one pays large amounts of money for just any player 
    ⊨ They will not pay a million euros for every stuck up player 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
Finally, as is clear from our definition, what is crucial for the DD in order to 
be felicitous is that the CGA and the CGG are disjoint. Accordingly, it is only 
crucial that p is inconsistent with one of the generalization that are part of CGG. 
The following example, relating to Isaac's Binding from the book of Genesis, 
illustrates that this inconsistency can result from a proposition different from p, 
but still entailed by p:  
(19) 'avraham kima't šaxat   liDD 'et ha-ben šelo 
  Avraham almost slaughtered to.me  ACC the-son his 
‘Abraham almost slaughtered his son!’ 
CGA Abraham almost slaughtered his son  
⊨ Abraham thought of slaughtering his son 
CGG Fathers do not slaughter their sons  
⊨ Abraham didn't think of slaughtering his son 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
In this example, the generalization by itself seems to only infer that fathers do not 
slaughter their sons, but prima facie not that "they do not almost slaughter their 
sons". As illustrated above, the inconsistency derives from a plausible entailment 
from the sentence in (19), which is that Abraham had in mind to slaughter his son. 
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At the same time there is a plausible entailment from the norm "fathers do not 
slaughter their sons" that they do not even entertain the thought of doing so. The 
inconsistency stems, therefore, from the entailments of the asserted p and of the 
deontic generalization in the CGG. 
In the following section, we turn to present some evidence in support for our 
analysis. 
5  Substantiation 
First and most importantly, DDs do not affect truth conditions. According to (12), 
the DD never alters the truth value of the proposition to which it is added, it only 
indicates the CG status of that proposition. The following observation is a major 
piece of evidence for this claim (see Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh 2015a, for a fuller 
discussion): 
(20) hu  lo   lakax  liDD/lexaDD/lanuDD  'et   ha-trufa! 
he  not  took  to.me/to.you/to.us  ACC  the-medicine 
  ‘He didn't take his medicine. That's weird!’ 
(21) 'eyze   tas la-misxak?     be-'aškelon  hu  lo  holex,  
  which fly  to.the-game?   in-Ashkelon  he  not go,   
  ex       tas      liDD/lexaDD/lanuDD  le-švaic?! 
  how  flying to.me/to.you/to.us  to-Switzerland 
‘What do you mean fly to the (soccer) game, this is unusual since even to 
Ashkelon he won’t go, he’s flying to Switzerland?!’ 
These examples show that the referent of the DD can be either of the speech event 
participants. There is no truth conditional effect dependent on this choice. In this 
respect the DD radically differs from other non-core datives in Hebrew, where a 
change in referent induces a change in the denotation of the affected additional 
event participant, be it e.g. a beneficiary, maleficiary or an affected experiencer 
(Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh, 2015a, see also fn. 5 above). 
Second, the DD operates on a proposition. Being a discourse management 
device, the DD always scopes above negation. Since the DD indicates the 
relationship between the CGG and the CGA, it may do so only after the CGA is 
already updated. This is relevant only after the truth conditions of the entire 
proposition are computed, and for this purpose negation is part of the proposition, 
and as such it is evaluated with respect to the CGG. This is precisely the case in 
example (1)/(16). Consider its affirmative version in (22): 
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(22) hu  lakax liDD 'et   ha-trufa 
he  took  to.me  ACC  the-medicine 
  ‘He took his medicine. That's weird!’ 
CGA He took his medicine 
CGG People who are healthy do not take medicines  
⊨ He did not take medicines if he is healthy 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
The use of the DD in this case is felicitous in a context where the 
generalization is that he should not take his medicine, if e.g. he finished his 
dosage, or is allergic to its ingredients. This observation regarding the scopal 
interaction of negation is not a trivial one. As Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh (2015a) 
note, other types of non-core datives can scope below negation as well. In 
particular, in the case of the Affected Dative the datival expression can be part of 
the negated event or attach above it, enabling two types of readings: being 
affected by the non-occurrence of the event, or negating that there was an 
affecting event. In other words, the prejacent to which a DD is added is of the 
opposite polarity to that of the proposition on which the normative generalization 
in the conversational background is based. Here is an additional example, based 
on (4)/(15) above: 
(23) hu lo  tas   liDD  le-švaic 
  He not flew to.me to-Switzerland 
  ‘He didn’t fly to Switzerland. That's weird!’ 
  CGA He didn't fly to Switzerland 
CGG Given his habits, he flies abroad  
⊨ He flies to Switzerland 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
Further substantiation for our analysis of the DD as a discourse management 
device comes from the possible clause types allowed for clauses featuring the DD. 
First, being a discourse management device the DD is not expected to occur in 
embedded clauses. The reason is that the embedded proposition is not the one 
directly up for being added to the CG. The following example attests that this is 
indeed case. 
(24) dani yada še-hu  lo  lakax #liDD/lexaDD/lanuDD   'et    ha-trufa 
  Dani knew that-he not took  to.me/you/us       ACC  the-medicine 
‘Dani knew that he didn't take his medicine, (#which is weird).’ 
Note however that this state of affairs obtains when the attitude holder is not a 
speech event participant. In comparison, in (7)-(9) above, a DD in the embedded 
Discourse update at the service of mirativity effects: The case of the Discursive Dative 
117 
clause poses no problem, when the explicit or implicit epistemic argument of the 
main predicate is the speaker. 
Second, the DD is not felicitous in polar interrogatives clauses. 
(25) #hu  lakax  liDD/lexaDD/lanuDD 'et   ha-trufa?  
  he  took to.me     ACC   the-medicine 
‘Did he take his medicine?’ (Intended: contrary to what a person like him 
should do in a similar situation) 
Interrogatives with DDs can only be felicitous as rhetorical questions. These two 
facts are of no surprise if we assume the analysis of Hamblin (1973)/Karttunen 
(1977) for questions (26), according to which the semantics of a question is the 
set of propositions that correspond to a possible answer to the question. 
(26) [[Q]] = λp<s, t> λws λq<s, t> [q = p ∨ q = ~p] 
Accordingly, it is impossible to add the DD to a question since it contains both p 
and ~p, and only one of them is inconsistent with the contextual norm. Therefore, 
the felicity condition specified in (12)/(13) is not met. However, when the 
question is rhetorical it is possible to add the DD. For our purposes, it is sufficient 
to say that in the case of rhetorical questions the semantics of the question is not 
the set of propositions that correspond to a possible answer to the question, but 
merely one answer, salient in the context. In fact it is possible to raise a rhetorical 
question only when the answer is given to both interlocutors, and therefore this 
answer is added to the CGA and as such it can also be evaluated against the CGG. 
This is exemplified in (27):7 
(27) A: ha-menahel  šel ha-Po'el  šilem  liDD  milyon yuro  
  The-manager of  the-Po'el  paid  to.me million euros  
   'al eyze falcan 
  on some  stuck up 
‘The manager of the ha-Po'el paid one million euros on some stuck up 
soccer player. That's inappropriate!’ 
  B: ma  'ata  roce  mimeno? 
   what you  want from.him 
   ha-menahel  šel  Makabi  lo  šilem  lexaDD milyon yuro  
the-manager  of  Maccabbi  not paid  to.you  million euros  
   'al  eyze  falcan?! 
   on some  stuck up 
‘What do you want from him? The manager of Maccabi didn't pay one 
million euros on some stuck up soccer player?!’ 
                                                          
7 Ha-Po'el and Maccabi in this examples are the names of sport groups in Israel. 
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A's utterance is no different from (5)/(18). In B's utterance, the DD is felicitous 
with respect to the answer for the rhetorical question in it (in our case the positive 
one), which constitutes an exception to the salient generalization. 
6  Concluding remarks 
In this paper we argue that the DD is a discourse management device with the 
following properties: it is non-truth conditional, it applies to propositions, and it 
involves only the speech event participants. The current investigation contributes 
to strengthening the view that our modeling of the CG should be enriched to 
handle various conversational phenomena. An additional contribution of our 
paper is to refine the inventory of linguistic expressions, which are cross-
linguistically described as having mirativity effects, providing a way to 
understand their source.  
Finally, this type of non-core dative doesn’t seem to be unique to Hebrew. 
The following are examples from French (taken from Leclère 1976), (28), and 
from the Judeo Arabic of Tafillalt (Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh 2015b), (29), two 
unrelated languages, where a datival expression seems to produce a similar 
interpretative effect. 
 (28) Au mont St Michel,  la mer   te   monte à une de ces vitesses !      
  at Mont St. Michel, the sea to.you rises  in one of these speeds 
‘You won’t believe how quickly the sea raises at the Mont St. Michel!’  
CGA At Mont St. Michel the sea rises very quickly 
CGG The sea doesn’t usually rise that quick  
⊨  At Mont St. Michel the sea does not  rise very quickly 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
(29) hada wakf-li/na   f-t-̣tṛiq         
  this standing-to.me/us  in-the-road 
‘He's standing in the middle of the road, so weird.’  
  CGA He is standing in the middle of the road 
CGG People do not usually stand in the middle of the road  
⊨ He is not standing in the middle of the road 
CGA ⊄ CGG  DD is felicitous 
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